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	<title>Comments on: The Great American Homeowner Swindle Part #2</title>
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	<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/</link>
	<description>- Free Mortgage, Auto and Student loan Calculators by LoanWorkout.org</description>
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		<title>By: plogonot blog</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6749</link>
		<dc:creator>plogonot blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Nov 2007 20:27:34 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;strong&gt;plogonot 89 post&lt;/strong&gt;

all about plogonot and top news</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>plogonot 89 post</strong></p>
<p>all about plogonot and top news</p>
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		<title>By: svirtokilo blog</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6748</link>
		<dc:creator>svirtokilo blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 02:29:43 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;strong&gt;svirtokilo 23 post&lt;/strong&gt;

all about svirtokilo and top news</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>svirtokilo 23 post</strong></p>
<p>all about svirtokilo and top news</p>
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		<title>By: Moe</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6747</link>
		<dc:creator>Moe</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Oct 2007 20:34:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/07/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6747</guid>
		<description>&lt;P&gt;The basic math is lenders and investors lose but servicers gain. Your&#160;loan is most likely being serviced. Servicing companies make money be delaying and using stall tactics to cause you to be delinquent. Sometimes even telling you that you have to be late, in order to collect more fees and penalties.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;Often, the actual lender or investor is unaware that these servicers are using these mob like tactics to extort money from homeowners.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;What we have here are three sets of people trying to make money here. The lenders, investors&#160;and the servicers. Unfortunately the servicers are running the show and as long as they keep using these mob like tactics, homeowners will be the ones who suffer.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The basic math is lenders and investors lose but servicers gain. Your&nbsp;loan is most likely being serviced. Servicing companies make money be delaying and using stall tactics to cause you to be delinquent. Sometimes even telling you that you have to be late, in order to collect more fees and penalties.</p>
<p>Often, the actual lender or investor is unaware that these servicers are using these mob like tactics to extort money from homeowners.</p>
<p>What we have here are three sets of people trying to make money here. The lenders, investors&nbsp;and the servicers. Unfortunately the servicers are running the show and as long as they keep using these mob like tactics, homeowners will be the ones who suffer.</p>
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		<title>By: Todd</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6746</link>
		<dc:creator>Todd</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Oct 2007 04:29:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/07/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6746</guid>
		<description>Here is how I see it.  At some point the lenders/investors will have to deal with the the basic math of the situation.  A $300k loan that goes bad and is only supported by a house that can sell for $200k is worse than changing the 8 or 9 or 10% current rate (which is moot because it wont be collected for long)to 5 or 6%.  Isnt it really that simple?  Of course, the common sense approach is often rejected because someone feels they can somehow still do better by some other means.  What am I missing???&lt;br /&gt;T</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is how I see it.  At some point the lenders/investors will have to deal with the the basic math of the situation.  A $300k loan that goes bad and is only supported by a house that can sell for $200k is worse than changing the 8 or 9 or 10% current rate (which is moot because it wont be collected for long)to 5 or 6%.  Isnt it really that simple?  Of course, the common sense approach is often rejected because someone feels they can somehow still do better by some other means.  What am I missing???<br />T</p>
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		<title>By: Moe</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6745</link>
		<dc:creator>Moe</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Oct 2007 02:03:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/07/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6745</guid>
		<description>Right on again April!&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The key in what you said (because anyone who doesn&#039;t understand some of the lingo above) is the servicers get paid more when a loan is in default by collecting these &quot;extra&quot; fees that do not have to account for. It makes perfect business sense to cause homeowners to go into default and then collect these extra fees and essentially get rich off of the fees. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Hell, what do they have to gain by helping? Didly squat! They gain by homeowners delinquencies and defaults.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Also like you said, there is a big issue in regards to actual ownership and the validity of the ownership of the theses notes. Homeowners can use that as a defense of a notice of default filed by a servicer and contest its lawfulness by making the argument that they are not the &quot;legal&quot; and &quot;proper&quot; party filing the suit. Do they not have to produce the original note with the original borrowers signature on it? Theses mortgages were usually bought and sold many times, so that would be impossible in some cases.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;I am very interested to hear more from you and also a possible collaborative effort. How can we force this effort when it seems as if they operate under the rules of the &quot;wild,wild west&quot;?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Right on again April!</p>
<p>The key in what you said (because anyone who doesn&#8217;t understand some of the lingo above) is the servicers get paid more when a loan is in default by collecting these &#8220;extra&#8221; fees that do not have to account for. It makes perfect business sense to cause homeowners to go into default and then collect these extra fees and essentially get rich off of the fees. </p>
<p>Hell, what do they have to gain by helping? Didly squat! They gain by homeowners delinquencies and defaults.</p>
<p>Also like you said, there is a big issue in regards to actual ownership and the validity of the ownership of the theses notes. Homeowners can use that as a defense of a notice of default filed by a servicer and contest its lawfulness by making the argument that they are not the &#8220;legal&#8221; and &#8220;proper&#8221; party filing the suit. Do they not have to produce the original note with the original borrowers signature on it? Theses mortgages were usually bought and sold many times, so that would be impossible in some cases.</p>
<p>I am very interested to hear more from you and also a possible collaborative effort. How can we force this effort when it seems as if they operate under the rules of the &#8220;wild,wild west&#8221;?</p>
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		<title>By: April</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6744</link>
		<dc:creator>April</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Oct 2007 23:51:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/07/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-6744</guid>
		<description>Who exactly own and manage the servicers are the investors who hire the servicers via pooling and servicing agreements which are very long 500 to 1000 page contracts on file with the SEC (unless private equity)and these contracts are where we can force change. &lt;BR&gt; &lt;BR&gt;They are already full of requirements for troubled loan servicing and workout/modification obligations that the servicers are supposed to follow, but the servicers are not incentivized to do anything but service the defaulted loan into foreclosure. Now, the servicers are the couriers of the legal releases being forced on subprime victims to get workout relief that require the borrower, as a condition of accessing the workout to waive all claims, past, present,and future the servicers, the lenders and the investors who claim to own the loan, although that is a different story. It is debatable whether the trustees of the mortgage backed securities can legally establish that they own these loans. &lt;BR&gt; &lt;BR&gt;Many times the lenders didn&#039;t actually, really transfer ownership of the loan to the trust in a way that complied with the statute of frauds or other legal requirements under the laws that regulate contracts involving interests in real property or with the laws and regulations that regulate securities. These loans were &quot;sold&quot; with recourse, but when the trusts asked for performing loans, the lenders could not produce and almost 100 lenders filed for bankruptcy or shut down. The servicers are conflicted often because they are forced to buy into the riskiest tranches of the securities and because they can collect without disclosure extra super duper default fees for doing &quot;special&quot; loan servicing of loans in default.&lt;BR&gt;&#160;&lt;BR&gt;The servicers get paid more for servicing a loan in default as opposed to a performing loan. The PSAs don&#039;t require the servicers to account for these extra &quot;special&quot; default loan collection fees to anyone. We can force a national process for workout that is process driven and accessible via the internet and that requires subprime ARMs that meet specific criteria (has to be for a homeowner living in the property) to &quot;fix&quot; at the teaser rate and do it now.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Who exactly own and manage the servicers are the investors who hire the servicers via pooling and servicing agreements which are very long 500 to 1000 page contracts on file with the SEC (unless private equity)and these contracts are where we can force change. </p>
<p>They are already full of requirements for troubled loan servicing and workout/modification obligations that the servicers are supposed to follow, but the servicers are not incentivized to do anything but service the defaulted loan into foreclosure. Now, the servicers are the couriers of the legal releases being forced on subprime victims to get workout relief that require the borrower, as a condition of accessing the workout to waive all claims, past, present,and future the servicers, the lenders and the investors who claim to own the loan, although that is a different story. It is debatable whether the trustees of the mortgage backed securities can legally establish that they own these loans. </p>
<p>Many times the lenders didn&#8217;t actually, really transfer ownership of the loan to the trust in a way that complied with the statute of frauds or other legal requirements under the laws that regulate contracts involving interests in real property or with the laws and regulations that regulate securities. These loans were &#8220;sold&#8221; with recourse, but when the trusts asked for performing loans, the lenders could not produce and almost 100 lenders filed for bankruptcy or shut down. The servicers are conflicted often because they are forced to buy into the riskiest tranches of the securities and because they can collect without disclosure extra super duper default fees for doing &#8220;special&#8221; loan servicing of loans in default.<br />&nbsp;<br />The servicers get paid more for servicing a loan in default as opposed to a performing loan. The PSAs don&#8217;t require the servicers to account for these extra &#8220;special&#8221; default loan collection fees to anyone. We can force a national process for workout that is process driven and accessible via the internet and that requires subprime ARMs that meet specific criteria (has to be for a homeowner living in the property) to &#8220;fix&#8221; at the teaser rate and do it now.</p>
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		<title>By: Moe</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-936</link>
		<dc:creator>Moe</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Oct 2007 03:09:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/07/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-936</guid>
		<description>Yes, I agree. Let&#039;s not leave it in their hands because we know where that would put the consumer.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, I agree. Let&#8217;s not leave it in their hands because we know where that would put the consumer.</p>
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		<title>By: april</title>
		<link>http://loanworkout.org/2007/10/the-great-american-homeowner-swindle-part-2/#comment-935</link>
		<dc:creator>april</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Oct 2007 00:59:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The troubled consumer home loan restructuring process has to have some way to accomodate the poor credit health of most of the folks in default on their ARMs. We should create these adaptive underwriting standards.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The troubled consumer home loan restructuring process has to have some way to accomodate the poor credit health of most of the folks in default on their ARMs. We should create these adaptive underwriting standards.</p>
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